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Abstract: Every day we make use of a huge variety of signs. For the most times, we do 
it deliberately, creating a wide range of messages and meanings. However, sometimes 
we use signs unconsciously. So, do we still creating a wide range of messages and 
meanings using signs unconsciously? A sign can be used without any intention of the 
emitter to communicate anything? Meanings are made everywhere. In the religious field 
of meaning-making, can we imagine religious practices and rites without symbols, 
meanings, Gods or feelings represented in images? My primary focus is on how 
semiotics can be used in the social study of religious symbolism; my following focus is 
on the patterns and structures of signs used in religious practices, conditioning the 
meanings which can be communicated and understood. I will also focus on the relations 
between signs in a social and cultural context; the connections between signs, myths 
and ideology. So, as I ask in the title: Is religious fear a disease? Is it rational? If not, 
why God remains a “grammatical ghost”, according to George Steiner’s expression? If 
it is, what’s the role of semiotics to religious belief and practice? My purpose is to 
reflect if religious fear is a mental and mythic disease and if religion is deeply tied to 
mythic meanings forming ideologies for beliefs in God. 
 
Keywords: Fear, meaning, religion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Mythic meanings and ideology for beliefs in God: Is religious fear a disease? 
 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
 
“The fear of society, which is the basis of morality, and the fear of God,  
which is the secret of religion, are the two things that govern us.”  
(Oscar Wilde, The Portrait of Dorian Gray) 
 
In a small book entitled Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, Michel Foucault 
summarizes the pretentious and burned down human nature as follows: “According to 
Freud, there are three major narcissistic wounds in Western culture: the wound imposed 
by Copernicus; the one made by Darwin when he discovered that man descended from 
the ape; and the wound caused by Freud when he, in turn, discovered that consciousness 
arises from the unconsciousness” (Foucault, 2000: 51-2). 
The Freudian wound comes from the understanding of religion as the extension 
of the more archaic illusions, i.e. religion expresses infantile wishes projected in 
adulthood; it is the manifestation of hidden meanings of unconscious drives. 
Human nature is, in general, suggestible and imaginative; it is likely to believe in 
reality or metaphysical entities. This is, for example, the conviction of Spinoza, who 
said that individuals would not be superstitious if they were able to govern all their 
circumstances by a set of rules or if they were well-off. On the contrary, individuals are 
often driven on narrow paths, for which they need rules, oscillating between hope and 
fear. Therefore, individuals are, concluded Spinoza, prone to credulity, to blindly 
believe in superstitions engendered, preserved and nurtured by fear. Spinoza pointed out 
this fear that leads to the gullible in the Preface to his most well-known work Tractatus 
theologicus politicus, meaning that it is the fear that, on the one hand, promotes beliefs 
and superstitions and, on the other hand, guide the conduct. 
On the phenomenology of religious life, Heidegger (2010: 255) sustained the 
same: “it is the fear that guides”. But fear is a genuine fear, a reverence. Heidegger 
mentioned this idea from Kierkegaard, who believed that the fear discovers the fate. 
Considering beliefs as product of the fear or feelings of inferiority will be designing a 
human psychological conception of religion. In the same context of Spinoza, David 
Hume argued in 1757 in his The Natural History of Religion, a vision of religion based 
3 
 
on naturalism and psychology of individuals, insofar as he held that the idea of religion 
emanated and developed according the uncertainty and fear towards life and not 
according to reason. 
My purpose is to develop a psychological perspective about religion as a psychic 
reality, the result of a sort of mental construction of reality, and an emotional 
mechanism of collective meanings, like the fear. Both aspects of this negative 
perspective guide people over the social practices. 
 
2. RELIGION AS A PSYCHIC REALITY AND A HIDDEN MEANING OF FEAR 
 
This psychological perspective of religion is close to a phenomenological 
conception. Rudolf Otto represented this phenomenological perspective, which 
conceives religion in a psychological dimension, exploring the sacred as a mystery. The 
representation of the sacred as a mystery has important advantages, as recognized by 
Niklas Luhmann (2007: 56): “what we perceive becomes strange, but it leaves it in the 
condition we may perceive”. The sacred is presented as a mystery, i.e. prohibition or 
impossibility of communication that defines a certain sense to the sacred object that 
raises mystery. 
Rudolf Otto looked at to understand what he called “the experience of the 
numinous”. According to Roger Caillois (1988: 16), Otto’s work is about the subjective 
dimension of the subject, that is, it’s about the feeling of the sacred. The sacred is 
analyzed from a psychological perspective and in an almost introspective way. 
In his infamous work, The Idea of the Holy, Rudolf Otto (2005: 21) summarized 
the experience of the numinous as “mysterium et tremendum fascinans”, a mystery that 
causes fear and, simultaneously, fascination. The sacred is an unique category of the 
religious domain, it is ineffable and escapes from the rational domain, giving rise to 
complex, original and particular feelings, i.e. the essence of religious experience. 
Therefore, the subject of an experience of the numinous lives in a relationship with the 
sacred as a level break that allows him to enter into a totally different order of reality. 
According to Otto’s view, religion can be understood only through the notion of 
holiness, an a priori category, a non-rational feeling or intuition of the numinous. This 
is a feeling of fear and mystery, an experience of something “totally other” which is 
manifested in various religious and mystical experiences of devotion. Currently, 
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religious experiences continue to reveal these feelings of fear and mystery, explaining 
that this is the sense that supports any religious belief. Thus, in a context where 
individuals feel full of uncertainties and fears, religion asserts the contributive role to 
the maintenance of the values of life as the ultimate reward, the possibility of success, 
happiness and prosperity. In other words, these are the bases of human nature. 
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James demonstrated the 
psychological feature of human nature, in general, and that of religious experiences, in 
particular. In a mixed environment of a certain radical empiricist (or pragmatism) and a 
transcendentalism, James pointed out religion as a subjective experience, i.e. a solemn, 
serious and emotional attitude. The conception of religion proposed by James (as the 
feelings, acts and experiences of individual in their solitude) is refuted, for example, by 
Daniel Dennett (2006: 11). According to Dennett, by focusing on the individual and 
their private religious experiences, James would have no difficulty in identifying a 
solitary believer as someone with a religion. For Dennett (2006: 11), James believed 
that the beliefs, rituals, components and political hierarchies of organized religion were 
distractions from the essential religious phenomenon, but also social and cultural factors 
affecting the structure and content of the experience of individuals. 
If the meanings of things and situations are not products of effective and 
concrete causes, but the creation of subjective individuals, then, a psychological view of 
religion can better understand the meaning and the sense of religious experience. The 
idea of religion conceived as a “collective unconscious”, a shared psychic reality, also 
fits the psychological perspective of religion and human nature. The work of Carl Jung, 
Psychology and Religion, is representative of this idea, by suggesting that religion is not 
just a sociological or historical phenomenon, but also has a deep psychological 
significance. Like Otto, religious experience is understood as being submissive to a 
cause or an external power and superior to the human realm. A religious belief is seen 
as psychologically true, since the underlying idea exists in someone’s mind, that is, 
someone believes in that idea. Jung defined religion as a numinous experience which 
appropriates and controls human domain. By designating the religion as “collective 
unconscious” Jung identified some crucial functions to the personality of individuals, to 
the extent that meanings were linked to the existence. But it also revealed a therapeutic 
role. 
These meanings and therapies are due, according to Jung, to the fact that people 
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believe in religious illusions and unfathomable ideas like God. There is an empirical 
reason for people to believe in these illusions and ideas that can never be proven: these 
illusions and ideas are known to have a given utility. People normally need to believe 
on general ideas that assign meanings to their lives and lead them to seek a place for 
themselves in the world. 
Religious beliefs are, in the sense proposed by Jung, a kind of mental therapy to 
the many limitations of people (suffering, ignorance, anxiety, rage, illness, old age, 
death, etc.). Jung not only reduced religion to a psychological phenomenon, he also 
raised the unconscious as a religious phenomenon. In addition to understanding religion 
as a psychic reality, Jung also considered religion as an expression, a subjective 
expression of an objective reality. 
 
2.1. PSYCHO-PATHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION 
 
In the Introduction of this article, I mentioned an interesting idea expressed by 
Foucault regarding the Freudian narcissistic wound in Western culture: the 
unconsciousness. When he presented a detailed and realistic picture of human condition, 
Freud pointed out a scientific therapy aiming to make people soft to be “worked” and 
not make people good (Murdoch, 2001: 50). 
In his book The Future of an Illusion, Freud (2006a: 52) presented a negative 
and critical view of religion as a “universal obsessive neurosis of humanity”. Religion is 
an illusion (Freud, 2008: 9). George Steiner (2003: 32) argues that the book Civilization 
and its Discontents offers an ironic and desolate diagnosis of the tensions, deletions and 
distortions undergone by the psychê in the process of their adjustment to the economies 
of organized society. Reflecting about the misfortune, apparently inherent to the human 
species, caught in biological and social drives and constraints, Freud’s get increasingly 
interest into the mythical (Steiner, 2003: 32). 
According to Freud (2008: 20), people are governed by false standards they seek 
for themselves to serve as “religious consolation” or palliative face the difficult and 
painful threats of external world. Religion answers to people’s desires, because it offers 
promises of happiness to the eternal question of the meaning of life. For Freud (2008: 
26), this is the happiness of the ataraxy or “artificial paradises” that lets escape from the 
pressures of reality. The religion is a collective illusion; it is a hallucinated 
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reconfiguration of reality. The religion imposes to everyone and equally the same path 
to happiness and the same defence against suffering; it plays a deleterious influence 
(Freud, 2008: 34-5). 
When someone chooses the path of religion, he is choosing not to suffer due the 
prepotency of nature, the fragility of the body and the failure of social institutions that 
rule relations between men in the family, state and society (Freud, 2008: 37). Given the 
social origin of suffering, people activate certain mental mechanisms of protection. The 
faults or deficiencies lead people to the need to eliminate such faults or deficiencies 
through civilizational resources (a set of values, actions and useful skills or 
achievements giving protection against nature and regulation of human relations) which 
are subterfuges. For example, Freud considered the ideal of omnipotence and 
omniscience created by men and embodied in his gods. Believers assigned desires to 
these gods and to the civilizational ideal, whose satisfaction seemed impossible or 
forbidden. According to Freud (2008: 44) man became a prosthetic god. 
The Future of an Illusion pointed out a critical psychological perspective, but 
also a grammatical perspective, considering that people, especially the more educated, 
dissecting the meanings of words until the last effort to ascertain their senses, calling 
“God” to a vague abstraction that they previously created for themselves. 
 
2.2.MYTH AND MYTHICAL MEANINGS 
 
The humanity records many myths invented and sustained by human beings. 
This fact reveals that the surrounding reality for all people is not limited to the visible 
material world, but also involves a hidden and intangible dimension, which serves the 
demand for a more comfortable and rewarding existence. In various cultures and 
societies, myths distinguish the passage and retention of human beings in the world, 
through the fertile and necessary human capacity to have collective metaphysical ideas 
which serve to overcome the tangible everyday experience. 
People produce, consume, use and seek meanings to understand why they are 
gregarious and consciousness beings about the past. The distinguishing feature of the 
human mind to skilfully create and own ideas and experiences that cannot be rationally 
explained inspire our symbolic imagination. With this faculty (the symbolic 
imagination) we may reflect or not about several mysterious issues. The symbolic 
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imagination is provided by the representative power of signs, indispensable elements in 
any myth. According to Karen Armstrong (2006: 8), the imagination is the faculty that 
produces religion and mythology, whether in contemporary mythic thought eventually 
come under discussion, questioning or discrediting and therefore be rejected as 
irrational and serve the individual interests or desires. 
If the symbolic imagination is the faculty that produces religion and mythology, 
both (religion and mythology) serves to widen the scope of human beings, because they 
allow us to live more intensely in a codified, symbolized and mythologized world. In 
this case, religion and mythology has always been assumed as more accessible and 
traditional ways of reaching ecstasy or rapture. For example, according to Karen 
Armstrong (2006: 21), most religions and mythologies of ancient societies are imbued 
with nostalgia for the lost paradise. That’s why the primary objective was to show 
people how they could come back to this archetypal world. 
The myth is a narrative, a story with evocative and exciting content conveyed 
orally. According to Roland Barthes’ Mythologies (2007b: 261), the myth is a 
communication system, a message, i.e. the myth can be an object, a concept, an idea, in 
short, a speech in any medium. The myth is always present in the collective memory, 
but it is also susceptible to adaptations. It is the vehicle for conveying moral teachings 
about how to behave (Armstrong, 2006: 10). The myth has the power to manage desires 
or fears, motivating people to do certain things. 
The myth is able to help people dealing with problematic human conditions, i.e. 
finding their place in the world. Another function of the myth is to organize the society, 
regarding an individual and collective psychology. The myth is true because it is 
effective, not because it convey factual information (Armstrong, 2006: 15). The myth is 
effective even if it reveals or shows an illusion or an impossible meaning. The myth is 
true and effective providing us a new insight into the deeper meanings of life, i.e. 
working as a guide. 
The human existence would be bearable without myths? If it would be not 
bearable, it would certainly be more difficult to support human existence without myths, 
because they play a palliative role on the desires, anxieties and fears present in the 
collective mentality. 
Nowadays, according to George Steiner (2003: 16), we need myths as never, i.e. 
we need a full explanation or an assured prophecy, because we cannot overcome and 
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resolve the existential antinomies and antitheses through rational processes. So, we 
remain capable of manufacturing myths, because we are a sort of “myth-poien primate” 
(Levi-Strauss apud Steiner, 2003: 40). Only we can build, shape and give emotional 
adherence to the myth-logic, “the mythical and the logical, the logical inside the myth” 
(Steiner, 2003: 40). This ability has not been extinguished yet, although we are 
increasingly in a secularized and post-modern world, which is marked by the 
globalization phenomenon of all human experiences. 
 
2.3. THE SECULARIZATION OF POST-MODERN MAN 
 
In the Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche sought to demystify the relative 
importance that people attach to certain entities. Nietzsche wanted to show that the 
foundations upon which we build our truths, especially the more sacred or absolute for 
us (those assuming the form of “our idols”) were a product of history. 
Therefore, Nietzsche proposed that we use reason to understand precisely the decision-
making power, the will to power as an insatiable desire to manifest power that is most 
crucial, rather than life and nature. Nietzsche had an uncommon and orthodox 
conception of true. The truth was not conceived by Nietzsche as something we discover 
about the world. The truth is a moral quality and, therefore, something subjective, 
controversial and interpretable. Morality is the province of the collective, not of the 
individual. It is the collective that give us the concepts of “good” and “bad”, without 
allowing us to create our own conceptions. 
Nietzsche’s nihilism and will to power marked the end of modernity. According 
to Gianni Vattimo (1998: 19) modernity was announced by Nietzsche as the final 
consummation of the belief in the human being and reality as objective data. Following 
this perspective, we have an illusory and socially constructed consciousness. 
However, this collective consciousness is irrational, because it allows us to 
perceive and accept an unsatisfactory and dual reality, since it does not correspond to 
the expectations and hopes of a better life. This reality is based on meanings which 
cannot be universal. On the contrary, we use, produce and consume relative meanings 
regarding the social context in which we operate. Despite the post-modern societies 
were homogenized in their uses, customs, desires, needs and social behaviors, there are 
no universal meanings about social reality or absolute values, such as happiness, 
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because circumstances are different. We live in pure abstraction mediated by language, 
because we are beings who inevitably speak to each other through a shared code and 
shared abstractions of subjective experiences. 
The Nietzsche’s perspective shows the misconceptions of the “idea of God” or 
the “idea of God’s love for his creatures”. However, these ideas provide comfort to their 
believers. People act and behave in society and they face the reality based on the 
meaning that things have or take for them. The society is conceptualized and encoded 
through socio-cultural integrated systems of communication, i.e. systems of coded 
messages where the meanings of things are shared as social heritage. 
In Nietzsche’s perspective, God died. How? God’s followers and believers 
learned not to lie, because God ordered, and they discovered that God was, after all, a 
lie created by the believers themselves. The death of God is an opportunity to incarnate 
and to empty the divine. Without myth, cult, ritual and ethical life, the sense of the 
sacred dies. The death of God symbolizes the uprooting of human beings and humanity 
itself in a world that become demythologized and unspeakable. 
Then, the collective existential problem was: How to live without God, without 
illusions, without neuroses in a seemingly chaotic world? Against all the background of 
post-modernity, the individuals must become free from their own limitations, from the 
comfortable collective and constructed ideas of God and truth. The post-modern man, 
secularized, believes he does not need anymore the psychological and magical comfort 
provided by the idea of God and, therefore, he accepts the hypothesis that there are no 
transcendent powers able to guarantee the desired happiness. The post-modern man has 
learned, therefore, to live without fear of God or religion and he was cured of the 
sickness of holiness. 
As product of a epoch, the post-modern man is forced to a) discard the spiritual 
comfort or the ancient nostalgia for the absolute, provided by the collectively 
constructed ideas of “God” and of “absolute and organized world”; b) accept his limited 
and finite human condition in a relative and chaotic world; c) engage in the search of a 
happiness that only depends on him. 
This post-modern (deconstructive and post-structuralist) perspective rejected the 
concepts of a modern and romantic vision of the world. The rejection is due to the 
distressing and meta-narrative feature of this modern and romantic vision, i.e. to the 
fabricated stories and illusions about the reality (Spretnak, 2009: 45). 
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This post-modern perspective argues that there is nothing in human experience 
that is not a social construct. So, people do not have, in fact, any experiences or 
sensations that are not shaped or socially constructed. Connotations, shared meanings 
and collective concepts like “God”, “truth”, “knowledge” or “culture” are social 
constructions; they are created in order to obtain and maintain power over others 
(Spretnak, 2009: 45). 
 
3.CONCLUSION 
 
What is the possible relation between feelings of fear and religious feelings? 
Religion depends on fear? According to A. C. Grayling (2010: 35), fear is the basis for 
many social diseases. Fear gives rise to superstitions and feelings of antipathies or 
hostility towards new or different beliefs and practices. Sometimes fear is associated 
with ignorance: both have an inexorable logic in human attitude, harm people and 
inhibit free and bold actions; other times, fear arises through ignorance or through the 
refuse to accept the factual truth. For example, some religious beliefs foster the fear of 
death, because people simply do not want to die and would rather not think about it. 
However, death is inevitable and people know it even not want to die. Some religious 
conceptions promise what people want: eternal life beyond death, i.e. an alternative to 
the inevitable and inalienable death and fear of death in this world. 
According to the classical view of Aeschylus, fear makes people weak. Grayling 
(2010: 35) develop this premise, saying that fear undermines confidence, affects the 
performance, weakens the decision and distorts perceptions, creating obstacles and 
monsters where they don’t exist. According to Grayling (2010: 124), the religious 
attitude is marked by a strong refusal to accept things as they are, if this proves 
inconvenient. Interpreting the divine order is to accept the logical fallacy argumentum 
ad baculum, i.e. the answer of religion to the question of moral skepticism “Why should 
I behave in such a way?” will be “Because God says so”. Grayling explained that this is 
a euphemistic way of expression to say “Because you’ll be punished if you don’t 
behave this way”. 
The paradox of the logic of argumentum ad baculum is based on the fact that it 
consists in a threat. This threat cannot be a logical justification to act in a certain way. 
So, if there is a God (or a certain divinity) with punitive and vindictive character (like 
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the Judeo-Christian god) it might be wise to obey and, consequently, avoid the flames 
of hell. But the threat of punishment is not a reason, based on principles, to obey 
(Grayling, 2010: 125). 
It is obvious that the perspective of religion, as Grayling recognized, would 
strongly argue that the reason to act morally is not (and should not be) the threat of a 
divine revenge, but only love (in the Greek sense of the word agape, altruistic love, and 
Latin sense caritas, charity) for God and for other human beings. If love is, in the 
religious view, the only or the most compelling reason to act and be moral, what is the 
relevance of God existence? That is, if there are human feelings of altruistic love and 
charity, so why God would exists to push an ethical life? The existence of God would 
only be justified if God would assume a supervisory role over what people do, based on 
the criterion of good. But this divine existence would lead to a context of fear, threat 
and punishment. 
Before death, God is like an invisible policy; after death, God is threat of terror 
to bad actions in life. Both situations certainly do not contribute to the enrichment of the 
moral life, since the foundation they offer consists of fear and threats of punishment. 
Exactly what, among other things, a moral life gives us if we follow it (Grayling, 2010: 
126). Given this paradox, why religion has so much power to influence our conduct? 
Oscar Wilde’s proposition (presented as an epigraph to this article) means that 
the fear is an integral element of human nature and serves as a mechanism of defense 
against unknown superior forces and can bring some protection to the man himself, who 
need or prefer to believe in them. According to Oscar Wilde (1999: 36), the fear is the 
secret of religion, because religion feeds on the fear that creates in people. Religion 
arouses fear by horror stories about the end of (sinful) life, the apocalypse or death 
through the proposal of salvation from the evils of the world. By accepting the proposal 
of salvation, believers have to undergo, be afraid not to sin or do not have free will in 
action and thought. 
In his most famous work, The Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde wrote that 
courage disappeared from our race and perhaps we never really had it. So, the only way 
to get rid of a temptation is to fall into temptation. If we don’t give up, our soul become 
sick wishing forbidden things (Wilde, 1999: 37). It is only in the brain, according to 
Wilde, where the great sins happen. The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the 
invisible (Wilde, 1999: 41). 
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The psycho-pathological perspective of religion shows adverse psychological 
effects caused by religious beliefs, keeping us away from factual truth and proposing a 
idyllic scenario on which we should/must believe. For example, arguing that the 
function of some inconvenient truth is to destroy the lie and, in doing it, it affect the 
happiness of the subject; seek and find the truth is to find a personal fate, because it is 
like to find a poisonous truth, i.e. it is to leave from an illusion that even provides peace 
of mind while we move away from the truth. 
It is not easy to deal with feelings, as Freud (2008: 10) admitted. In particular 
purely subjective religious feelings, which are not associated with any certainty. An 
immediate strange feeling for Freud (2008: 11), because it would represent, for 
believers, a supposedly indestructible union and a belonging to external world. 
Religious symbolism plays an important role in the mental construction of 
reality. To create mythical meanings (in order to justify religious beliefs) shows fear. It 
seems to be a natural consequence of an inherent sickness of holiness. The religious fear 
is a consented sickness and, therefore, it is irrational. The religious fear is a mental 
sickness, benefiting from the fact that religion is deeply linked to the formation of 
meanings related to mythical beliefs in God. 
This religious fear is also social, because what happens is taken as an expression 
of divine will. The feeling of guilt is caused by the fear of authority, and this requires 
the renunciation of instinct’s satisfaction (Freud, 2008: 86). Religion needs the authority 
to impose itself and to impose commandments. While moral system, it is based on 
social values in order to be useful, requiring them to all who want to live under it. 
According to Friedrich Schleiermacher, religion is a feeling or sense of absolute 
dependence. 
The religious sentiment is entirely irrationalness. The idea of God is an 
anthropomorphism of consciousness, i.e. it is to give individuality to consciousness 
(Pessoa, 2006: 33). If it is required a predisposition for each disease, a predisposition of 
the soul and body for the disease (a sort of abnormality), then the Freudian conception 
recognizes the human nature his own predisposition to collective neurosis that is 
religion. 
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